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Abstract
Hume presents two definitions of cause in his Enquiry which correspond
to his two definitions in his Treatise. The first of the definitions is ontological
and the second is psychological; indeed, the definitions are extensionally and
intensionally distinct. The critical mistake of the skeptical interpretation
is the assumption that the two definitions are equivalent, and the critical
mistake of the necessitarian is the assumption an association of ideas can
be had from one experiment. This paper attempts to clarify Hume’s finally
considered position of causality.
1 The Problem of Interpretation
Before attending to the influential elements of Hume’s theory, it is worthwhile to
indicate several reasons for the often disparate interpretations of causation drawn
from A Treatise of Human Nature (1739),1 An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Na-
ture(1740), and An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding (1758)2 The
purpose of this section is to indicate that much of the psychological support for
the causal argumentation in the Treatise is irrelevant to the influence of Hume’s
doctrines; in this manner, Hume’s theory of causality can be extricated to some
extent from his detailed psychological arguments without creating major misun-
derstandings.
Hume completely disavowed the Treatise and wrote in an advertisement to the
Enquiry that the argument in the Treatise needed clarification and better expres-
sion. He admits to “some negligences” in reasoning, and he requests that the work
1E. L. A. Selby-Bigge (1888; rpt. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968). Hereafter page refer-
ences to A Treatise of Human Nature will be cited in the text as “T.” In quotations from this work
spelling but not punctuation has been modernized.
2E. P. H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (1777; rpt. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975). Hereafter page
references to A Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding will be cited in the text as “E.” In
quotations from this work spelling but not punctuation has been modernized.
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not be regarded further. In addition, the Abstract, published anonymously, is far
too sketchy by itself to provide a focus for causal doctrines. It is, for the most part,
a summary of the arguments given in the Treatise and was disowned also.3 Thus,
if we were to take Hume at his word, only the Enquiry should be studied for his
full causal doctrines; however, this is not usually done for the following reasons.
Hume’s youthful enthusiasm and to some degree his perspicacity in the Trea-
tise are attenuated in two significant ways in the Enquiry. First, causal doctrines
are reformulated with an eye toward simplicity and clarity; second, some difficult
and controversial subjects of the Treatise are dropped from the Enquiry. Nat-
urally, this situation opens fertile territory for scholars. For example, are there
insurmountable differences between the works?4 More specifically, is Hume’s
retraction in the Enquiry to be taken seriously?5, p. 57, argues that Hume sim-
ply wanted to dissociate himself from a badly received work. Some writers have
taken Hume at his word and only considered the Enquiry; see, for example, An-
thony Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief New York: Humanities Press, 1961),
pp. 1-17. Are the accounts of causation in both works consistent with one an-
other?6 Is there a predominant doctrine of causality in the two works?7 There
have been several different plausible responses to these questions, and because of
this, Hume’s influence is manifold.
More important for the present discussion, several critical problems arise from
the omission of vital topics in the Enquiry–topics necessary for the completion of
the causal argument. The ideas of existence, external existence, and substance, as
well as the distinction between causation as a philosophical and a natural relation
are omitted. Furthermore, the consideration of space and time is almost totally
3Charles Hendel, however, argues that the Abstract was an outline of the Enquiry rather than
the Treatise. See his “Editor’s Introduction,” An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (In-
dianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), pp. xviii-li. J.O. Nelson suggests that the Abstract might have
been written by Adam Smith. See his “Has the Authorship of the Abstract Really been Decided?,”
Philosophical Quarterly, 26 (January, 1976), pp. 82-91.
4L. A. Selby-Bigge argues in the “Editor’s Introduction” to the Enquiry by means of a passage
by passage comparison that the differences in the two works are significant, but there is not a
substantial doctrinal difference. A survey of differences of opinion on this view point is illustrated
by the following articles: W. B. Elkin, “Relation of the Treatise of Human Nature (Book I) to
the Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” Philosophical Review, 3 (1894), pp. 672-688;
J. O. Nelson, “Two Main Questions Concerning Hume’s Treatise and Enquiry,” Philosophical
Review, 81 (1972), pp. 333-352; N. Kemp Smith, “David Hume: 1739-1939,” Aristotelian Society
Proceedings, Suppl. Vol. 63 (1939), pp. i-xxiv.
5L. F. V. Kruse in Hume’s Philosophy in his Principal Work the Treatise, and in His Essays,
trans. P. T. Federspiel (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1939
6J. O. Nelson in “Two Main Questions” convincingly argues that Hume disowned the Treatise
because of its metaphysical arguments–an interpretation which this essay later adopts.
7In this chapter I assume without attempting to prove that the causal arguments in the Treatise
and Enquiry are compatible; consequently, since both works have been influential, both are utilized
in constructing Hume’s doctrines. For reasons given later, the causal arguments in the Enquiry are
given more weight than is usually accorded by contemporary commentators.
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excluded from the Enquiry.8 Selby-Bigge points out that “the account of causa-
tion which Hume gives afterwards in the Enquiry is left hanging in the air when
the support of the theory of succession has been withdrawn” (E, xii). Moreover,
other crucial issues are somewhat neglected in the Enquiry: the distinction be-
tween accidental and lawlike generalizations, the universality of causality, and the
question of lawlike behavior. Consequently, the causal argument in the Enquiry
is, at best, incomplete.9 For these reasons, recent commentators have attempted
to weave various doctrines from the Treatise into those from the Enquiry–usually
with primary emphasis on the Treatise.10
The point in considering the questioin of philosophical differences between
the two works is to suggest why certain features for the support for Hume’s causal
doctrine in the Treatise have not been influential. Undeniably, Hume’s work as a
whole has had an important formative influence on contemporary empiricism,11
but it will briefly argued here that the metaphysical and psychological aspects of
his Treatise have not exercised a significant contemporary influence. Although
Book I of the Treatise is currently the more highly regarded of Hume’s epistemo-
logical works, it has not had the influence in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century that the Enquiry has had. For instance, W. B. Elkin points out in 1894
that Hume’s advertisement to the Enquiry was taken seriously by commentators;
the advertisement refers to the Treatise as “that juvenile work, which the author
never acknowledged” (E,2).12 Some time before the advertisement was published,
Hume advised Gilbert Elliot against reading the Treatise: “[The Enquiry] contains
everything of consequence relating to the understanding, which you would meet
with in the Treatise, and I give you my advice against reading the latter. By short-
ening and simplifying the questions, I really render them much more complete.
8Hume does have two pages on the subject of space and time in the Enquiry, but these pages
are a reduction from some forty-three pages in the Treatise.
9Selby-Bigge states further, “But it is not too much to say on the whole that the omissions in the
section 12 of the Enquiry [which are substituted for the topics of knowledge and reality in Book
I, Part IV of the Treatise] are alone amply sufficient to render it quite impossible to comply with
Hume’s wish and treat the Enquiry as representing the whole of his philosophic system” (“Editor’s
Introduction,” p. xx).
10Flew, Hume’s Philosophy, p. 1.
11For example, T. E. Jessop writes, “[Hume] has by many been reduced to a label or a standard-
bearer for a cause, for subjective positivism ...” (“The Misunderstood Hume” in Hume and the
Enlightenment, ed. W. B. Todd (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1974), p. 1). A central point of
Kruse, Hume’s Philosophy is to show Hume’s influence on some of the logical positivists. Robert
Sternfeld outlines Hume’s influence on contemporary “operationalists” and “experimentalists” in
“The Unity of Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” Review of Metaphysics, 3
(December, 1949), pp. 184-189.
12
“For while Hume’s true significance for the history of philosophy is contained in Hume of the
Treatise, the Hume that is generally presented in the histories of philosophy, and the Hume that
is best known, is the Hume of the Enquiry” (Elkin, “Relation of the Treatise,” p. 673). See also
Flew, Hume’s Philosophy, p. 15.
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Addo dum mino. The philosophical principles are the same in both ...”13
Although the philosophical principles are alike in both works, there are more
than rhetorical differences present. Elkin marks the difference by asserting that
causation as a subject is discussed explicitly in the Treatise; whereas, it is only im-
plicitly discussed in the Enquiry14 The critic’s task has been made difficult because
of the slightly differing perspectives of the two works. The Treatise is bolstered by
an elaborate psychological epistemology: Hume is not concerned with causality
per se but with evidence for causal beliefs.15 The central question of Book I, Part
III of the Treatise is the origin of the idea of causation. initially, at least, Hume is
willing to assert the only relation at the foundation of science “that can be traced
beyond our senses, and informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see
or feel is causation” (T, 74). Nevertheless, at the end of Hume’s investigation of
the source of our causal inferences, just before the two summarizing definitions of
cause, he concludes, “Now the nature and effects of experience have already been
sufficiently examined and explained. it never gives us any insight into the internal
structure of operating principles of objects, but only accustoms the mind to pass
from one to another”(T, 169).
As is well known, Hume does not directly concern himself with the ontological
problem of causality in either the Treatise or the Enquiry; he, in effect, attempts
to avoid what he elsewhere terms “metaphysics” by recasting the questions in
psychological form. That is, rather than asking “What is the nature of causal
connection”” he asks, “What is the origin of the idea of causation?” (q.v., T,
74). In the Enquiry the question becomes “how we arrive at the knowledge of
cause and effect” (E, 27). To some degree, the ontological and epistemological
questions are inextricable, and the exact nature of their relation is a problem of
major philosophical importance.
However, even though there is a similarity of perspective in the two works,
the argumentative sequences on the subject of causation are quite different in the
Treatise and the Enquiry. In the Treatise causal inferences are based upon the
resemblance and contiguity between an impression and an idea. The evidential
support for the causal inference is custom or habit. On the other hand, in the En-
quiry the role of contiguity for causal inference is altered. Here, causal inferences
are based on resemblances or uniformities within nature. The evidential support
for the uniformity of nature is custom, and the relation of contiguity is brought up
in order to clarify the nature of custom. The two definitions of cause given in the
Enquiry omit contiguity altogether. One reason, then for taking due account of the
13J. Y. T. Grieg, The Letters of David Hume (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1932), Vol. 1, p.
158. However, in the advertisement to the Enquiry Hume writes, “Most of the principles and
reasonings, contained in this volume were published in [the Treatise]” (E, 2).
14Elkin, ”Relation of the Treatise,” p. 681.
15This judgment so far as I know has not been disputed. An excellent justification for this
interpretation of the Treatise is Francis Chilton Bayles, The Causes of Evidence of Belief: An
Examination of Hume’s Procedure (Mont Hermon, Mass., 1936), esp. pp. 5-9 and 61-77.
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Enquiry in the reconstruction of Hume’s doctrine of causation is to avoid the onto-
logical problem of explicating the contiguity of an impression and an idea. Kemp
Smith, among others, notes that a substantial reason for writing the Enquiry was
that Hume was disturbed about his former account of impressions and ideas in the
Treatise.16
Another contrast between the two works is that the boundaries of what can be
known are somewhat extended in the Enquiry: “All reasonings concerning matter
of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means of that
relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses” (E, 26,
my italics). Hume states in the “Introduction” to the Enquiry that the handling of
psychological questions are nearly sufficient in themselves to account for all of
science: “It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science barely to know
the different operations of mind, to separate them from each other, to class them
under their proper heads ...” and so on. On the same page Hume refers to this
enquiry as “mental geography, of the delineation of the distinct parts and powers
of the mind” (E, 13). Then, using Newton’s natural philosophy as a methodolog-
ical paradigm, he asks, “But may we not hope, that philosophy ... may carry its
researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret spring
and principles, but which the human mind is actuated in its operations?” (E, 14).
Since Newton had determined the laws and forces of the solar system, “there is no
reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers
and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution” (E, 14) In short, the
Treatise’s construction of the science of man on narrowly circumscribed empirical
foundations is broadened in the Enquiry: “To throw up at once all pretensions of
this kind [i.e., going beyond the evidence of our senses to the establishment of
general principles] may justly be deemed rash, precipitate, and dogmatical, than
even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy, that has ever attempted to im-
pose its crude dictates and principles on mankind” (E, 15). This contrast between
the Treatise and Enquiry should not be pushed too far however, since Hume often
maintained that the principles in both works are the same.17
16Kemp Smith, “David Hume,” p. xx. Cf., also Elkin, “Relation of the Treatise,” p. 682; Nelson,
“Two Main Questions,” pp. 341-350; and Selby-Bigge, “Editor’s Introduction,” p. xii. Norman
Melchert, “Hume’s Metaphysics,” Journal of Philosophy, 71 (1974), p. 753, suggests that the
main source for these assessments is Hume’s own admission in the “Appendix” to the Treatise:
“In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to
renounce either of them; viz. that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct
existences” (T, 636, italics deleted).
17Phillip D. Cummins, “Hume’s Disavowal of the Treatise,” Philosophical Review, 82 (1973),
pp. 371-379. Cummins attempts to establish that in both works Hume is committed to the position
that psychological objects (impressions and ideas) are the subject matter of nonhumanistic science.
I do not think that Cummins’ arguments are compelling, but I doubt that this dispute can be easily
settled. I incline to the view that Hume of the Treatise was somewhat more dogmatic in many
passages in his denial of unperceived objects. Hume mentions “the positive air which prevails in
that book” (Grieg, Letters, Vol I. p. 187). In any case the procedural point, that Hume’s analysis
5
1 THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION
In addition, it is arguable that Hume might have been disturbed about an im-
plication of the Treatise that all sciences are to be based on psychological ob-
jects (impressions and ideas)–that “secret” causes and objects mentioned in the
Treatise not only have no basis but are, in a straightforward sense, unknowable
thing-in-themselves. In the Treatise Hume is constructing the science of man,
not just according to “mental geography,” but according to the derivation of ideas
and principles from impressions. The Enquiry, then, does not substantially alter
Hume’s project of the science of man: the work is concerned with inference and
belief as a basis for humanistic and physical sciences. Consequently, it, unlike the
Treatise, does not base natural science on psychological entities.
J. O. Nelson has plausibly argued that Hume’s repudiation of the Treatise was
not unlike that of Wittgenstein’s rejection of the Tractatus. The major thrust of the
Enquiry, according to Nelson is to criticize the flights of philosophical reasoning–
in particularly, the theorizing from the nature of impression and ideas.18 He argues
that in the Enquiry “that part of the science of man, which in the Treatise de-
manded that the subject matter of the nonhumanistic sciences be shown to consist
of psychological objects, is eliminated. This operation removes the metaphysical
and therefore corrupt parts of the science of man but not the science of man.”19
The import of Nelson’s thesis for Hume’s doctrines of causality is adopted here
without further argument as a convenient framework in which to study Hume’s
contemporary influence. Therefore, Hume’s theory of causal inference in the
Treatise and Enquiry is analyzed without an attempt to deal with the psychological
basis for that kind of inference.
These considerations provide some justification for ignoring much of the psy-
chological and metaphysical bases for Hume’s conclusions about causal infer-
ences. It is suggested that Hume may have rejected the Treatise for the following
reasons. Hume was probably dissatisfied with psychological and metaphysical ar-
guments concerning impression and ideas; he thought that he could establish his
views on causation without supporting them by reference to psychological objects.
Furthermore, he believed the Enquiry was a clearer statement of his philosophical
principles. Certainly, the metaphysical support for Hume’s particular psycholog-
ical doctrines in the Treatise have not been significant in many of the current
interpretations of his causal doctrines.
Speaking broadly, then, commentators are left with a retracted, complex, and
somewhat inconsistent Treatise, a sketchier, less rigorous, but clearer Enquiry. For
these reasons, it is not surprising Hume’s causal doctrines have been interpreted
of causation can be studied independently of complex psychological support, seems to be agreed
on all sides. Cummins writes, “The metaphysical doctrines of the Treatise were not repudiated;
rather the detailed psychological arguments concerning the causes of beliefs were dropped” (p.
379). Also see footnote 16, p. 5.
18Elkin partially concurs: “the mode of expression is more hesitating and cautious than in the
Treatise” (“Relation of the Treatise,” p. 682).
19Nelson, “Two Main Questions,” pp. 340-341.
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in different ways. The problems of collation are too many and too complex to
be handled here, and if the rationale given for Hume’s rejection of the obscure
psychological arguments of the Treatise are of any weight, it would be a mistake
to count those arguments as essential to this theory of causality. Our interest is
focused on Hume’s influential tenets of causality rather than a detailed analysis
of the psychological support for those tenets. In this manner, those doctrines
underlying what may be termed “the contemporary regularity theory” of causation
are accented.
2 Hume’s Causal Theory
Much of the controversy surrounding Hume’s analysis of causality stems from
what his intentions are taken to be. Sterling Lamprecht points out that the sup-
position that knowledge of the world begins from the knowledge of the struc-
ture and function of the mind is an element in common among eighteenth cen-
tury philosophical works. “It is this approach which created the epistemological
problem with which modern philosophy has been so conspicuously concerned.”20
By means of a judicious selection of slightly guarded passages from the Treatise
and Enquiry, different commentators have supposed the chief value of Hume’s
method is predominately skeptical, logical, linguistic, empirical, or psychologi-
cal.21 While it is true it is unwise to strike off the results of Hume’s causal anal-
ysis from the methods of enquiry, it is equally unwise to select certain kinds of
arguments from Hume’s causal analysis to fit one’s preconceptions of the kind of
philosophy he was doing. One way to minimize the dangers of extracting Hume’s
definitions of cause from the science of human nature is to organize the argu-
mentation according to an ontological structure initially allowed but not finally
endorsed by Hume: (1) external bodies, (2) perceptions, and (3) mind (cf., E, pp.
73-74, 82-83). By the organization of the examination of Hume’s two definitions
in this way, the arrangement of this section will indirectly reflect Hume’s broader
concerns of the science of man without attending explicitly to the Humean psy-
chology and metaphysics.
20Sterling P. Lamprecht, “Empiricism and Epistemology in David Hume,” in Studies in the
History of Ideas, Vol. 2, ed. Dept of Philosophy, Columbia University (New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 1925), pp. 221-222.
21For example, Hume’s influence is take mainly to be: (a) skeptical, by Rufus Suter, “A Skeptic
Among the Scientists,” Scientific Monthly, 53 (1941), pp. 565-568; (b) logical, by Karl Aschen-
brenner, “Psychologism in Hume,’ Philosophical Quarterly, 11 (1961), pp. 28-38; (c) linguistic,
by Virgil C. Aldrich, “Two Hundred Years after Hume’s Treatise,” Journal of Philosophy, 36
(193(), pp. 600-609; (d) empirical, by R. E. Hobart, “Hume Without Scepticism (I),” Mind, 39
(1930), pp 273-301, and “Hume Without Scepticism (II),” Mind 39, pp. 409-425; and (e) psycho-
logical, by James H. Lesher, ”Hume’s Analysis of ‘Cause’ and the ‘Two Definition’s Dispute’,”
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 11 (1973), pp. 387-392.
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First, a preanalytic Humean contrast between perceptions or thought and ex-
ternal objects of nature is drawn. The contrast suggests two perspectives on the
Humean definitions of cause: the ontological and epistemological perspectives.
Second, the two definitions of cause are analyzed. A close examinations of the
definitions reveals issues which become prominent in the contemporary philo-
sophical problem of causation. Third, the major interpretations of Hume’s writing
are shown to be a result of how commentators handle the ontological and epis-
temological perspectives of Hume’s definitions of cause. In the next section the
major points of Hume’s causal commitments are summarized, and several diffi-
culties with his theory are discussed.
3 Epistemological Background to Hume’s Theory
Hume makes a loose and preliminary distinction between a succession of external
objects and a succession of ideas. Experience shows that there is no necessary
connection between what is perceived or thought and the nature of external bod-
ies. yet, if an order of ideas did not correspond in some way to the external world,
human life would be imperiled. This is not merely a question of making slips be-
tween cup and lip, but a question of the possibility of man’s existence. Although a
connection between mental and physical phenomena is obscure and perhaps ulti-
mately unknowable when stated in such a manner, Hume assumes that there is “a
kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession
of our ideas” (E, 154). He does not maintain, however, that mistakes and other
unhappy features of human action do not occur, for “Nature will always maintain
her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatever.“ (E, 41)22
The two kinds of phenomena are asymmetrically related: thought alone is in-
sufficient to establish the external existence of objects, even though the origin of
many thoughts are traceable to external perceptions or impressions. Neverthe-
less, according to Hume, commonly thoughts are often assumed to be projected
to the objects. for example, a sentiment or feeling that events are necessarily con-
nected arises during the observation of a succession of events–a feeling which is
transferred to the events themselves. The sentiment is reified as power or energy.
“[T]hough the powers and forces, by which [the course of nature] is governed, be
wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone
on in the same train with the other works of nature” (E, 55-56).
What is characterized here as an ontological approach to causation is the view
that relations between external objects may be determined by the experimental
methods of science. The object of knowledge, then, is claimed to be the world
itself. Causal arguments, on this approach, are not claimed to have mathematical
22Hume states, “None but a fool or a madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of
experience” (T, 32).
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certainty or demonstrability: “Now what ever is intelligible, and can be distinctly
conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demon-
strative or abstract reasoning a priori” (E, 35). Hume writes, “By proofs, [I mean]
those arguments, which are derived from the relations of cause and effect, and
which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty”(T, 124).23 Since only obser-
vation could be a means of knowledge of the external world, the relations between
physical objects are known through experience.
The psychological approach to causation in Hume’s work historically derives
from John Locke’s statement: “the different clearness of our knowledge seems ...
to lie in the different ways of perception the mind has of the agreement or dis-
agreement of any of its ideas.”24 Thus, the objects of knowledge are perceptions
and the relations between perceptions, rather than physical objects and relations
between physical objects. John Herman Randall, Jr., expresses the contrasting
approaches this way: “For observationalism, ‘experience’ is taken as a method
of knowing; for subjectivism, it is taken as the subject-matter of knowledge. For
the first, experience is how we know; for the second, it is what we know.”25 For
consistency of terminology, “Ontologically” may be substituted for “For obser-
vationalism” in the above quotation and “psychologically” or “epistemologically”
for “for subjectivism,”26 depending on the proper sense of “experience” for Hume.
(Many times Hume writes as though perceptions alone are experienced.) From the
psychological point of view Hume writes, “By knowledge, I mean the assurance
arising from the comparison of ideas” (T, 124). It is important to point out that
in both the Treatise and Enquiry Hume ultimately rejects the dualism between
perceptions or thoughts and an extramental physical world.
By attacking the problem of causality in this manner, Hume makes the subject
extraordinarily complex. Not only does he investigate what can be known about
the connections between physical phenomena, but also what can be known about
the connections between ideas, and indeed, what can be known about the rela-
tion between physical phenomena and ideas. In other words, in order to enquire
into the nature of causality, Hume is at the same time examining the operations of
bodies (the ontological aspect), the operations between mind and bodies (the epis-
23The “degrees of evidence” for Hume are (1) knowledge, (2) proofs, and (3) probabilities (cf.,
T, 124).
24John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser (rpt. New York:
Dover, 1959), Vol. 2, p. 176.
25John Herman Randall, Jr., The Career of Philosophy (New York: Columbia Univ. Press,
1962), Vol. 1, p. 637.
26The contrast of Hume’s “levels of discourse” has been noticed by many commentators.
Among works cited so far, the following levels are noted: Randall (n.25): “observational, sub-
jective; Lamprecht (n. 20): empirical, epistemological; and Kemp Smith (n. 4): physical, psy-
chophysical, and psychial. Others include: Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of
Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 332-333, metaphysics, reasonable inference, and
human reasoning; and J. A. Robinson, “Hume’s Two Definitions of ‘Cause’,” Philosophical Quar-
terly, 12 (1962), pp. 162-172, philosophical, psychological.
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temological aspect), and the operations of mind (the psychological aspect). Hume
only later concludes that the integrity of these perspectives cannot justifiably be
maintained.
4 The Two Definitions
The ontological and the epistemological approaches are reflected in Hume’s two
definitions of cause in the Treatise:
T-1: We may define a cause to be “An object precedent and contiguous to
another, and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like
relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the
latter” (T, 170).
T-2: A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and is so
united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea
of the other, and the impressions of the one to form a more lively idea of the
other (T, 170).
Obviously, the two definitions are quite different: indeed, the restated definitions
in the Enquiry are different not only from each other but also from those given in
the Treatise. The definitions from the Enquiry are set out for comparison:
E-1: ... we may define cause to be ”An object, followed by another, and
where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the
second” or in other words ”where, if the first object had not been, the second
never had existed” (E, 76).
E-2: The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind by a customary
transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this we have experience. We may,
therefore suitable to this experience, form another definition of cause and
call it ”An object followed by another, and whose appearance always con-
veys the thought of the other” (E, 77).
Although these definitions, together with the relevant textual support, are usually
regarded as an expression of a regularity theory of causation, in fact several in-
terpretations emerge from a consideration of Hume’s definitions. These interpre-
tations are sometimes characterized as (1) the regularity theory, (2) the necessary
connections theory, and (3) skepticism. Very little will be said concerning the
latter two interpretations, and as will be argued later, they probably result from a
confusion about Hume’s intentions.
The first definitions, T-1 and E-1, hereafter termed ”the first textual defini-
tions,” may be considered definitions from an ontological perspective. Neither the
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objects of the causal relation nor the causal relation itself are defined in terms of
having been perceived.27 Also it seems apparent that no one could observe all
instances of a given causal relation in the manner prescribed. In any case, even
assuming that the requisite experiences could be had, definitions T-1 and E-1 do
not require that instances must be observed in order for the causal relation to hold.
Consequently, the first textual definitions are offered independently of causal be-
liefs or inferences, although part of the definitions could be used in the analysis of
causal beliefs or inferences.
Apart from the epistemological question of how causal relations are known,
the problem of the intelligibility of the first textual definitions in the Treatise and
Enquiry remains to be considered. The first textual definitions are similar, but they
are not, as come commentators have suggested, “unchanged.”28 In the Enquiry,
the addition of “if the first object had not been, the second had never existed”
suggests a counterfactual analysis. Even though the proper interpretation of coun-
terfactual conditionals is troublesome, the two parts of the first textual definitions
in the Enquiry clearly are not equivalent.29 The counterfactual, “If the first had not
been, the second would not exist” does not follow from “The first is precedent and
contiguous to the second, and all instances resembling the first are accompanied
in this manner to instances resembling the second.” Normally, a counterfactual
conditional does not imply that its antecedent is instantiated.
Another difference between the first textual definitions of cause in the Treatise
and Enquiry is that the use of “contiguity” and “precedence” in the first part of T-1
is expressed by the use of “following” in E-1. A succession of instances would
have to be analyzable into contiguity and precedence of the first instance to the
second for T-1 and E-1 to be equivalent. Tom L. Beauchamp gives such an ar-
gument and concludes that “succession” means for Hume “non-contemporaneous
but intervalless contiguity.”30 However, there is no need to insist on Beauchamp’s
argument since Hume makes it fairly clear in the latter parts of the Treatise and in
the Enquiry that spatial contiguity is not necessary for causality. For example, at
one point Hume writes:
27The fact that the definition does not depend upon an observation leads some commentators
to state that the ontological definition is the significant one. Cf., C. J. Ducasse, Nature, Mind
and Death (La Salle: Open Court, 1951), p. 93; J. A. Robinson, ”Hume’s Two Definitions,” pp.
162-172.
28Robinson, “Hume’s Two Definitions,” p. 164.
29Sometimes the two parts of T-1, the regularity analysis and a counterfactual analysis, are taken
to be Hume’s two definitions as in David Lewis, “Causation,” Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973),
pp. 556-557, but that use is not adopted here.
30Tom L. Beauchamp’s “Hume on Causation and Succession,” Dialogue, 13 (1974), p. 280.
Monroe C. Beardsley points out that spatial contiguity was dropped as part of the analysis of
causation in the Enquiry “because [Hume] was using the ‘event’ terminology in many places, and
a consideration of the problems of contiguity with respect to events would have forced upon him
a further analysis of the notion of event, and would thus have revealed some crucial difficulties in
his argument” (“A Dilemma for Hume,” Philosophical Review, 52 (1943), p. 30).
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This maxim is that an object may exist, and yet be nowhere; and
I assert, that this is not only possible, but that the greatest part of
beings do and must exist after this manner. an object may be said to
be nowhere, when its parts are not so situated with respect to each
other, as to form any figure or quantity; nor the whole with respect
to each other, as to form any figure or quantity; not the whole with
respect to other bodies so as to answer to our notions of contiguity or
distance. Now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and
objects, except those of sight and feeling (T, 235-236).
Of course, on Hume’s view “our perceptions and objects” are causally related
instances.
Except in reference to the association of ideas, spatial contiguity is not men-
tioned in the Enquiry, although Hume undoubtedly thought spatial contiguity im-
portant for a denial of gravity acting at a distance (cf., E, 73 n). Since “All causes
are of the same kind” (T, 171), namely efficient causes, if the spatial contiguity of
objects is not a necessary condition for some objects being causally related, then
it is not a necessary condition of causation.
In Hume’s writings, objects subject to the causal relation include impressions,
ideas, states of affairs, occurrences, events, and physical objects.31 Fundamen-
tally, he presupposes that all these “objects” are traceable to simple impressions.
The philosophical problems of resemblance and simplicity of the qualities of per-
ceptions, together with the problem of individuation of simple impressions are
formidable.32 In order to avoid plunging into the underlying metaphysical and
psychological support for Hume’s doctrine of relations, the relatively neutral term
“instance” is suggested as an adequate paraphrase of “object” in the definitions of
cause. On the assumption that T-1 and E-1 are equivalent, then three conditions
for individual instances c and e must be jointly satisfied for the causal relation to
obtain.
Df. 1: c causes e if and only if:
(a) c is precedent to e on a specific occasion.
(b) c is temporally contiguous to e on a specific occasion.
(c) Instances resembling c are always precedent and temporally contigu-
ous to instances resembling e.
31Beardsley notes: “In the Treatise [Hume] refers to causes and effects practically without ex-
ception as ‘objects’ (or qualities of objects); in the Enquiry he retains this terminology during some
phases of the discussion, but more often refers to causes and effects as ‘events’ ” (“A Dilemma for
Hume” p. 28).
32R. J. Hawkins has carefully attempted to explicate these terms and render Hume’s account
consistent, but he acknowledges “very large gaps in Hume’s system” (“Simplicity, Resemblance
and Contrariety in Hume’s Treatise” Philosophical Quarterly, 26 (January, 1976), pp. 24-38).
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(Normally, conditions (a) and (b) are captured by (c), except in cases where it is
doubtful whether instances c and e exist.) Succession, temporal contiguity, and
constant conjunctions of c to e are three conditions claimed to be individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for c to cause e on Hume’s account.33
Since the second textual definitions of each work utilize the first textual def-
initions, in order to show how causes come to be known, the second textual def-
initions may be considered definitions from an epistemological perspective. The
point of these definitions is not to justify causal inferences but to analyze and de-
scribe how causal inferences are made.34 Both T-2 and E-2 require a mental deter-
mination of the relation of two instances, c and e. Hume introduces the definitions
given in the Treatise by noting that the first textual definition is a philosophical re-
lation, and the second textual definition is a natural relation. As mentioned in the
first part of this paper, the distinction between philosophical relations and natural
relations is dropped from the Enquiry. Selby-Bigge confesses the distinction to be
“most bewildering,”35 but the distinction is initially suggestive for understanding
the perspectives of the two definitions given in the Treatise. Causation as a philo-
sophical relation is established by reflectively comparing one object with another
in an arbitrary manner. Consequently, a philosophical relation may be called a
kind of logical association. No mental determination by means of the association
of ideas need be present. On the other hand, causation as a natural relation is
an association of ideas, a psychological principle “by which one idea naturally
introduces another” (T, 10).
As long as Hume clings to the distinction between philosophical and natural
relations, the two textual definitions given in both works admit, in Selby-Bigge’s
words, “an invidious contrast between the subjectivity of the one and the objec-
tivity of the other.”36 Nevertheless, this contrast, invidious or not, is difficult to
avoid unless the apparent opposition between the two kinds of definitions could
be dissolved.
On the assumption that the second textual definitions, and therefore T-2 and
E-2, are equivalent, then four conditions seem to be necessary for the second
definition of causation:
Df. 2: c causes e if and only if:
(a) c is precedent to e on a specific occasion.
(b) c is temporally contiguous to e on a specific occasion.
33Cf. Beauchamp, “Hume on Causation,” p. 271; Wade L. Robison, “Hume’s Ontological
Commitments,” Philosophical Quarterly 26 (January, 1976), p. 45 n; Thomas Richards,“Hume’s
Two Definitions of Cause,” Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (July, 1965), pp. 251-252.
34A. P. Cavendish, David Hume, originally by A. H. Basson (1958; rpt. New York: Dover,
1968), p. 73.
35Selby-Bigge, “Editor’s Introduction,” p. xvii.
36Selby-Bigge, “Editor’s Introduction,” p. xvii.
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(c) The idea of c determines the mind to form the idea of e.
(d) The impression of c determines the mind to form an idea of e.
The first two conditions of Df. 2 are the same as the first two conditions of Df. 1:
D f .1(a)and(b) ≡ D f .2(a)and(b). (1)
The second two conditions, (c) and (d), of the second definition Df. 2, might be
said from a psychological perspective to parallel condition (c) of the first definition
Df. 1, which states “Instances resembling c are always precedent and temporally
contiguous to instances resembling e” That is, “idea of c” and “idea of e” could be
plugged into Df. 1 (c) resulting in something akin to Df. 2 (c). Also, “impression
of c” and “idea of e” could be plugged into Df. 1 (c) resulting in something akin
to Df. 2 (d).
Hume concludes his two definitions in the Enquiry with these words: “We may
consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights: but beyond
these, we have no idea of it” (E, 77). Hume’s “two lights” in the Enquiry cor-
respond to the philosophical and natural relations of the Treatise. Consequently,
Hume admits in both works that the textual definitions are intensionally distinct.
Since the first textual definitions do not rule out “concealed” and “secret” causes,
whereas the second textual definitions do rule them out, the two kinds of defini-
tions are extensionally distinct also.37
Conditions (c) and (d) of Df. 2 are statements concerning one kind of asso-
ciation of ideas; they are meant to describe not only the causal relation between
perceptions but also how our thoughts “go on in the same train” with nature. In
accordance with Hume’s purpose in the construction of the science of man, the
second textual definitions are intended to account for the association of the idea of
c with the idea of e according to past observations of c being constantly conjoined
with e. On this view, the regularity interpretation, the second textual definitions
are not an analysis of cause nor a justification of causal inference, but a description
of how ideas are causally associated.
On the regularity interpretation the first textual definitions are Hume’s analysis
of causation; the second textual definitions are part of Hume’s psychological the-
ory which presuppose the first textual definitions and are an assumed support for
causal belief. The second textual definitions are intended to account for how the
causal relation comes to be known without observation of, or an attendant psy-
chological feeling of necessarily related instances. J. A. Robinson clarifies this
point:
37Robinson, “Hume’s Two Definitions,” p. 164. When emphasis is placed on the Enquiry, the
distinction between philosophical and natural relations cannot be relied upon. Consequently, many
discussions based on this distinction which purport to show that the definitions are equivalent in
some way are irrelevant (e.g., Donald Gotterbarn, “Hume’s Two Lights on Cause,” Philosophical
Quarterly, 21 (1971), pp. 168-171, among others).
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Realizing, therefore, that [the first textual definitions], omitting the
element of inevitability or necessity, will shock those who believe,
mistakenly, that it should be included therein, Hume offers in [the
second textual definitions] a “compromise” characterization of the
cause-effect relation ...38
Thus, the second textual definitions are an attempt to show how the first textual
definitions may be applied to Hume’s more general interest of the science of man.
Most writers since the time of J. A. Robinson’s article have recognized that
the two kind of definitions are not equivalent. A typical account is given by Karl
Ashenbrenner. He argues that in the first textual definitions Hume is giving a
logical analysis for the purposes of science, and in the second textual definitions
Hume is giving a psychological description of the process of causal inference.39
Of course, while Hume is aware that these two definitions are not identical, the
regularity theorist is aware that to suggest that Hume was clear about the contem-
porary distinction between psychology and philosophy is an anachronism.40 At
the point in the Treatise where Hume takes up the two summarizing definitions,
the text presupposes such a division of interest; however, later in the Treatise and
in the Enquiry, the distinction between the two perspectives collapses. Hume
writes in the “Appendix” to the Treatise: “If we carry our enquiry beyond the ap-
pearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid, that most of our conclusions will
be full of scepticism and uncertainty” (T, 639).
Hume assumes that external physical objects, causes, and inductive inference
cannot be practically doubted. for instance, he writes that “the utmost effort of hu-
man reason is to reduce the principles, productive natural phenomena, to a greater
simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by
means of reasoning from analogy, experience, and observation” (E, 30). Never-
theless, the application of Hume’s radical empiricism41 shows that it is pointless
to attempt to reason about the structure of the world apart from what can be known
in human experience. Most of what Hume wrote on the subject of causation con-
cerns the rejection of the theories which postulate hidden causes, necessary con-
nections, and secret forces in nature. As is well known, Hume argues not only
that necessary connection cannot be observed, as in the case of the collision of
two billiard balls, but also that the supposition of power or energy is unwarranted
(T, 91). We cannot “penetrate into the reason of the conjunction” (T, 93) between
cause and effect.
38Robinson, “Hume’s Two Definitions,” p. 169.
39Aschenbrenner, “Psychologism,” pp. 28-31.
40J. A. Robinson rightly comments, “Systematic evasion of empirical questions is a affectation
philosophers have acquired in the twentieth century, and it is a very silly one” (“Two Definitions
of ‘Cause’ Reconsidered,” in Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), p. 163).
41William A. Wallace, Causality and Scientific Explanation, (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan
Press, 1974), Vol. 2, p. 41.
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5 Other Interpretations of Hume’s Definitions
It is uncontroversial that Hume denies that there are necessary connection in ob-
jects independent of experience, but does he totally deny the idea of necessity
from his account of causal inferences? There is not clear-cut answer to this ques-
tion. The following quotation from the Enquiry states Hume’s position: “And
as we can have no idea of anything which never appeared to our outward sense
of inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea
of connection or power at all, and that these words are absolutely with meaning,
when employed either in philosophical reasoning or common life’ (E, 74). How-
ever, Hume goes on to say, “But there still remains one method of avoiding this
conclusion ...” (E, 74), and he proceeds to the two definitions of cause.
Some passages from the Treatise suggest that “necessity” is part of the mean-
ing of “cause.” Kemp Smith argues, “Two distinct factors are involved in the idea
of necessary connexion, one as conditioning it, and one as constituting it Con-
stancy of conjunction is requisite as that through which alone a custom or habit
can be acquired.”42 It is undeniable that if Hume is attempting to justify causal
inferences, then some kind of necessary connection must correspond to the mind’s
determination in passing from one idea to another. However, as suggested earlier,
this kind of interpretation is probably a misreading of Hume’s intentions.
Many commentators have assumed that Hume regarded the two textual defini-
tions in each work equivalent. Even if the first two conditions of both definitions,
Df. 1 and Df. 2, are equivalent, it does not follow that the third condition of Df. 1
is equivalent to the third and fourth conditions of Df. 2; that is,
D f .1(c) . D f .2(c)and(d). (2)
However, if Df. 1 and Df. 2 were equivalent, the third and fourth conditions of
Df. 2 suggest that Hume’s reasoning is a petitio principii.43 In the jargon adopted,
on this view ontological causation is said to depend on the association of ideas;
yet, at the same time, this view points out that according to Hume the association
of ideas is only one kind of causation in general.
When the circularity of the two textual definitions under this interpretation
is considered with Hume’s destructive arguments against the ideas of necessary
connection and power, Hume’s causal analysis is said to result in skepticism.
However, probably the critical mistake of the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s
definitions of cause is the assumption that the two definitions are equivalent.
Others have pointed out Hume admits that one causal instance may be just
as good as a thousand instances in the determination of causal relations. Hume
42Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941), p. 373.
For an extended comparison of the regularity theory with Kemp Smith’s view, see Gregory M.
Zeigler, “Hume’s View of the Causal Relation,” Personalist, 56 (1975), pp. 351-263.
43For example, Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1945), p. 667.
16
5 OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF HUME’S DEFINITIONS
indicates as much in the following: “we may obtain the knowledge of a particular
cause merely by one experiment, provided it be made with judgment, and after a
careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstances” (T, 104).44 Given
the regularity interpretation, such a belief would be under very special circum-
stances, for example, a “crucial” experiment. Wade L. Robison, among others
concludes Hume’s admission is withdrawn in the Enquiry. Robison cites this text:
“there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connection which is
conceivable by us” (E, 74)45 A careful reading of the Enquiry (esp. E, 73-74) in-
dicates that in the context of the cited passage Hume is speaking about necessary
connection. In general Hume held that sufficient past experiences of a relevant
sort enable one to confirm a causal connection by one experiment, and repetitions
of the experiment under similar condition will corroborate the causal judgment.
He asserts in the Enquiry:
It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind,
that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular
event. Now where is that process of reasoning which, from one in-
stance, draws a conclusion, so different from that which it infers from
a hundred instances that are nowise different from that single one?
This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with
an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any
such reasoning (E, 36).
Whether a causal connection can be known from only one observation and no
prior observations of the relevant kind is quite doubtful on Hume’s theory. If there
were only one possible instance of a causal connection, however, then by the first
definition it would seem that c causes e. This causal relation could only be known
by attending to “circumstances foreign to the cause” (E, 77). The Enquiry makes
it quite clear that the basis on which “we form an inference from one [instance] to
another,” is the assumption that nature is uniform:
We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded
on the relation of cause and effect: that our knowledge of that rela-
tion is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental
conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be con-
formable to the past (E. 35).
How is this supposition to be supported? A central difficulty with Hume’s theory is
the justification for such judgments concerning matters of fact, and it is precisely
this problem which prompted Kant’s answer to Hume.
44This passage refutes a possible counter-example given by Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death,
p. 95. Also, cf., T, 173 ff.
45Robison, “Hume’s Ontological commitments,” p. 45n.
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